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Abstract  Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot 
competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that 
firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration 
system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share 
ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market 
and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is 
decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If 
wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to 
which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms 
share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers 
neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages 
share ownership. Fi- nally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares 
ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages. 
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